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INVENTORSHIP AND AUTHORSHIP AS ATTRIBUTION RIGHTS: 
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENTIFIC CREDIT 
 
 
“Why does your name even appear on the paper?” 
“I am the one who suggested the problem […] I prepared the grant 
application to the NIH. […] Without such support [my student] could do 
nothing. I’m not just talking about the fellowship. […] There’s both a 
teacher-apprentice relationship and collegiality.”  
(Djerassi C., Cantor’s Dilemma, Penguin Books, 1989; pp.50-51). 
 
“I think there’s rarely more than one inventor. I mean, if you wake up and 
you have an idea, that’s the invention. And then there’s all this work 
around it, of course … [The postdoctoral researchers] contributed to the 
work, but they didn’t do any really innovative work […] They don’t have 
time to think as much, they have a lot of manual labour to do” 
(McSherry C., Who Owns Academic Work?, Harvard Univ. Press; 2003; p.84) 
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Abstract: Authorship and inventorship are “attribution rights” upon which individual 
scientists build their reputation and career. Social and legal norms concerning their distribution within 
research teams are currently criticized for failing to inform third parties on individual contributions. We 
examine the case of teams engaged in the “double disclosure” of their research results through both 
publications and patents, and model the negotiation process taking place between junior or female team 
members and the senior (male) one. We suggest that the former may give up inventorship in order to 
secure authorship, even when entitled to the both. Based on a sample of 680 "patent-publication pairs" 
(related sets of patents and publications) we show that, very frequently, one or more authors of a 
publication do not appear as inventors of a related patent. This is less likely to happen for first and last 
authors, which is in accordance both with our model and the prevailing legal norms on inventorship. 
However, the probability of exclusion from inventorship also declines with seniority, and increases for 
women, which is compatible with our model only. 
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 1. Introduction 
Understanding how scientific knowledge is produced and reduced to practice is a central 
theme of today’s economic research. Both the sociology and the economics of science pay a great 
deal of attention to the system of incentives affecting academics’ choice of research topics and 
transfer tools, with special emphasis on the role played by personal reputation and intellectual 
property (Stephan, 2010). We contribute to this line of enquiry by studying the distribution of 
reputation among scientists working in teams and engaged in the “simultaneous disclosure” of 
scientific and commercial knowledge, by means, respectively, of publications and patents (Gans 
et al., 2011).  In particular, we show that the distribution of authorship (of publications) and 
inventorship (of patents) among members of a research team reflects not only the individual 
contributions to the research effort, but also the relative bargaining power and incentives of 
team members. 
We describe both authorship and inventorship as ’attribution rights’, a form of intellectual 
property recognized both by the social norms of science (Merton, 1957) and by international conventions 
on “moral rights” of authors and performers (art. 11 in UNESCO, 2001; and art. 6 in WIPO, 2008). Such 
rights provide signals to participants to knowledge markets, where problems of asymmetric information 
are particularly acute. Indeed, the scientist’s record as author and/or inventor is used by funding 
agencies or business companies to find the best researcher to sponsor, or the most-suited collaborator or 
consultant.  
Assigning attribution rights is however difficult when the relevant activities are 
performed by teams, rather than individuals, as it is increasingly the case with science and 
technology (Katz and Martin, 1997; Jones et al., 2008; Wuchty et al., 2007; Jones, 2009). This is 
because the existing social and legal norms defining attribution rights leave room to contrasts 
and negotiations among team members (Fernandez-Molina and Pais, 2001; Fisk, 2006). We argue 
that such negotiations, while possibly resolving in an optimal way internal disputes, may mis-
inform third parties on each team member’s actual contribution to the research and inventive 
efforts, thus possibly generating negative information externalities. As already discussed in other 
contexts (e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1987, on exclusive-dealing contracts; Hansmann and Santilli, 
1997, on visual artists’ rights), such externalities may affect negatively the efficiency of private 
agreements, as stated by the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960; Hermalin et al., 2007). 
With the help of a stylized theoretical model we identify a number of conditions under which 
inventorship may be attributed more sparingly than authorship, so that not all the co-authors of a 
scientific publication end up being included in the list of inventors of the related patents. In particular, 
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we argue that junior and female co-authors can convinced to give up inventorship, other things being 
equal, due to lower incentives to reclaim this type of attribution right, as opposed to authorship.  
We then test our propositions by using patent publication pairs (PPPs). A patent and a paper 
form a pair when they disclose the same research result, and at least one author and one inventor are the 
same person. Using text mining techniques we build an original sample of 680 PPPs produced by 308 
Italian academic inventors between 1975 and 2002, in the fields of Chemical Engineering, Electronic 
Engineering and Telecommunications, Pharmacology, and Biology. We complement these data with 
related bibliometric and gender information on the selected academic inventors and their co-authors. We 
estimate that the risk of an author's exclusion from a related patent is higher for junior and female 
scientists.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we recall the increasing importance of teams in 
publishing and patenting and discuss the concepts of inventorship and authorship. In section 3 we 
develop  a formal  model and the related proposition (full analysis in Additional Material). In section 4 
we describe our methodology for the identification of PPPs, the econometric model and the main 
variables. In section 5 we describe the data and estimate the probability for the co-author of a 
publication to be excluded from the related patent, as a function of her contribution to the publication, 
seniority, gender, and experience. We also perform robustness checks and discuss the implications and 
limitations of our analysis. Section 6 concludes and discusses the relevance of our findings for the domain 
of the economics of science, and beyond.  
 
2. Research teams and problems of attribution 
2.1 The increasing importance of teams in publishing and patenting 
The average number of authors per publication and inventors per patent has been increasing over time. 
By considering all scientific publications listed by the ISI Web of Science database, Wuchty et al. (2007) 
estimate that the average number of authors per paper moved from 1.9 in 1955 to 3.5 in 2000. For 
patents at the US Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), the same authors estimate an increase from 1.7 
inventors per patent in 1975 to 2.3 in 2000.1 According to Jones (2009), the scientific work is increasingly 
specialized and therefore requires teams of increasing size. In addition, the growing need of sharing data 
and facilities generate multi-team research which is conducive to multi-authorship (Katz and Martin, 
1997; Jones et al., 2008).  
1 Our own elaborations over data from the European Patent Office suggest an increase from 1.95 inventors per patent in 1980 to 
2.46 in 1999; when considering only patents in a science-based fields such as organic chemistry, the figures are respectively 2.76 
and 3.88 (data available on request). 
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Notably, the average number of inventors per patent remains lower than that of authors per 
publication, even for comparable technological and scientific fields (Meyer and Bhattacharya, 2004). 
One possible explanation is that patents originate mostly from industrial research, funded by business 
companies and carried out by their employees. The proprietary nature of the resulting knowledge output 
limits the inventors’ freedom to choose their research partners, contrary to what happens to academic 
scientists. However, differences in the number of authors and inventors can also be found when 
comparing patents and publications with the same contents and produced by same research team and 
programme (Ducor, 2000; Murray, 2002). In this case, the only possible explanation is that the 
qualifying criteria for being considered authors or inventors are different, or that some differences exist 
in the established practices of attribution. A vast sociological literature exists, which illustrates how 
negotiation plays a role in authorship attribution. A sparse legal literature on inventorship suggests the 
same. We examine both of them. 
2.2 The Vexed Issue of Authorship 
Attribution practices in scientific authorship have been largely discussed with references to 
malpractices, such as ‘guest’ (or ‘honorary’) and ‘gift’ authorship, which occur when a scientist is listed 
in the authors’ by-line of a paper to which she has not contributed (Mowatt et al., 2002). These problems 
are particularly felt in biomedical research, because of the great importance attached to ethical integrity 
and responsibility attribution in that field (Biagioli, 1998). As a consequence, since 1985, the 
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors has published and updated the ‘Uniform 
Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals’. The most recent edition states that:  
“Authorship credit should be based on 1) substantial contributions to conception and 
design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 2) drafting the 
article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) final approval of 
the version to be published […] Acquisition of funding, collection of data, or general 
supervision of the research group, alone, do not justify authorship” (ICMJE, 2007).2  
According to the ICMJE Requirements, therefore, a heterogeneous set of authors can be listed 
together in the same by-line. For example, a scientist who has limited herself to an entrepreneurial role 
(such as chasing grants, “conceiving and designing” the paper, and revising it “critically”) could be listed 
along with a colleague who has carried out most of the research work (such as acquiring, analysing and 
interpreting the data, drafting the manuscript, and providing the technical expertise). Despite such 
latitude, the ICMJE Requirements have been largely ignored by the scientific community. Bates et al. 
(2004) find that 60% of 72 articles surveyed in 2002 in the Annals of Internal Medicine and 21% of 107 
2 Similar rules, albeit less detailed, can be found in the authors’ guidelines of the International Electrical and Electronic 
Engineering association (IEEE, 2008; Section 8.2.1.A). More recently, several commentators have suggested that the notion of 
authorship in science is out-of-date, linked as it is to the idea of an integral responsibility of all contents of a paper, which is at 
odds with dominant practices of teamwork and division of labour. We come back to this point, as well as proposals to replace 
authorship with “contributorship”, in the Conclusions. 
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articles in the British Medical Journal have at least one author that does not meet the first ICJME 
criterion. Similar results are found by Hwang et al. (2003) for the Journal of Radiology (see also 
references therein on Lancet and the Dutch Medical Journal). This suggests that authorship attribution 
remains a subjective decision, which is negotiated within research teams, according to customary rules 
that do not necessarily match editorial guidelines.  
Name-ordering in the authors’ by-line is often used to shed light on individual contributions. 
Although general authorship guidelines do not provide mandatory recommendations, two major 
traditions exist: alphabetical ordering, which is typical, for example, of the social sciences, and 
contribution-related ordering, which is most common in the hard sciences and is explicitly recommended 
by some scientific societies (for a review, see Rennie and Flanagin, 1994; Drenth, 1998; Mowett et al. 
2002). The message conveyed by the first and last positions in a non-alphabetical by-line is relatively 
unambiguous: the first author is usually the scientist, often a junior one, who has contributed most to 
the paper; the last is a more senior investigator, who runs the lab, chases the grants, and sets the 
research strategy. The same cannot be said for the authors in between. These may be either effective 
contributors to the paper (although less important and/or more senior ones than the first author), but 
they may also be guest authors of many sorts (such as laboratory technicians occasionally rewarded for 
their dedication, or very senior scientists included out of deference). Still, some evidence exists on senior 
authors’ latitude in retaining first authorship or granting it to junior co-authors, depending on matters 
of convenience, such as the wish to support a disciple’s career or the necessity to boost their own 
(Zuckerman, 1968)3.  
2.3 Inventorship 
Inventorship is a legal concept which bears direct economic consequences. In the US, a patent 
may be declared invalid if the designated inventors’ contribution does not match the legally defined 
one.4 According to Title 35 of the US Code (as amended in 1984), two individuals can be designated as 
inventors on the same patent only if they have worked “jointly” and provided some kind of “inventive” 
contribution (Fasse, 1992, pp. 172-173). In particular, each person named on a patent must have 
contributed to the conception step in the invention (as defined by the claims). Conception is “the 
formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative 
invention, as it is to be applied in practice” (Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.).5 
In Europe, even with patents issued by the European Patent Office (EPO), inventorship is 
ultimately defined by the various national legislations. For example, in the United Kingdom the 
3 Contribution measurement is also difficult because individuals tend to overestimate their own inputs (Hoen et al., 1998; 
Johnson and Orback, 2002; for a discussion in economic terms, see Van den Steen, 2004). 
4 See for example Yeda Res. & Dev. v. ImClone Systems Inc. in 2006.  
5 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
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inventor is defined as the "actual deviser of the invention...", who in turn is the person who contributes 
to the novelty (inventive step) of the claims listed in the patent application (s7-3 Patents Act, 1977; 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/37). In Italy, as in many other countries, no specific definition of 
inventor is provided by legal texts. The legal doctrine on authors and inventors coincide, with the latter 
being simply defined as the “author of an invention”. Mis-attribution of inventorship does not appear to 
threaten the validity of the patent, but it may cause re-allocation of property rights. 
Existing inventorship norms in both the US and in Europe are more restrictive than the editorial 
rules defining authorship. As stressed by the legal opinions of university TTO officers and IP 
consultants, being involved in the conception of the invention is a requirement that several authors of 
scientific publications may fail (Bennett and Biswas, 1997; Hutchins, 2003; Vinarov, 2003). For 
example, current interpretations of the US law suggest that “merely suggesting a desired result” or 
“having entrepreneurial involvement” do not qualify as inventorship. Therefore, a scientist who raises 
funds, conceives the initial experiment, and revises the draft paper can qualify as the author of a project-
related paper (at least according to the ICMJE guidelines), but not as the inventor of any project-related 
patent. The same applies to whom, at the opposite end, follows “the complete instructions” of a 
colleague or superior.6 Notice that, as far as inventorship is concerned, name ordering affects neither the 
economic rights to which inventors are entitled (all inventors are equally entitled to any compensation) 
nor the reputation they get (alphabetical name ordering is the norm).  
Outside these extreme cases, however, the application of legal definitions of inventorship to 
members of a team is as controversial and open to arbitrary decisions as that of authorship (Fasse, 1992). 
Colyvas (2007) shows that, for the case of Stanford university, decisions on inventorship attribution, 
very much like those on authorship, often depend upon the discretionary judgement of the most senior 
members of the team, who manage the economic details of the research and exercise authority. Finally, 
very much like journal editors, patent office examiners leave the identification of inventors entirely to 
the applicants. At most, signed declarations are required. If not challenged in court, these initial 
attributions remain un-scrutinized. 
2.4 Seniority and gender in negotiation over attribution rights 
The previous discussion suggests that the attribution of both authorship and inventorship may 
be subject to negotiation within the team. Third parties observe only the final outcome. Such outcome 
may be affected by seniority, gender, and their relationship to individual team members’ incentives. 
Life-cycle models of scientists' behaviour suggest that junior scientists who pursue an academic career 
invest heavily in building a reputation within the academy, while their senior colleagues may choose to 
6 . The latter cases bring to mind situations in which a junior scientist or a graduate student may be rewarded with authorship 
for her brilliant assistantship, but not with inventorship. For a case of a student’s exclusion from a patent, see Fasse (1992; p. 
282). More cases of disputes within academic teams are mentioned by McSherry (2003) and Seymore (2006). 
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cash in the reputation they have already acquired, or to trade it for immediate economic returns 
(Stephan and Levin, 1992; Audretsch and Stephan, 1999). As a consequence, we expect junior scientists 
to value authorship more than inventorship. When compared to patents, papers circulate earlier, more 
widely and contain a much more readable explanation of the research results.7 On the contrary senior 
scientists may attach more importance to inventorship, both for the expected returns from patents and 
as a mean to increase their reputation (as technologists) beyond the boundaries of the academic 
community. 
Reclaiming attribution rights also entails costs. In particular, junior scientists may attach a 
negative value to the possibility to enter into conflict with their team’s seniors, from whose mentorship 
their careers largely depend (Pezzoni et al., 2012; and references therein).  
It is also important to take into account gender. First, women may be involved in fewer research 
projects than men, due to family-career trade-offs or a disadvantaged academic position, so that 
authorship will have for them a higher marginal value. Second, female scientists may also assign a lower 
value to inventorship than men. In this respect, several authors find that female scientists patent less 
than men with the same publication records (Breschi et al., 2005; Azoulay et al., 2007; Stephan et al., 
2007; see also Whittington and Smith-Doerr, 2008). This may be explained by Ding et al.’s (2006) and 
Murray and Graham’s (2007) analysis of longitudinal data on careers and field interviews, which show 
that women have fewer connections to operators in the marketplace than men. This diminishes their 
opportunities to commercialize their research results or to cash in their reputation through consultancy 
or participation in high-tech companies.8 
 
3. Negotiation over Authorship and Inventorship: A Stylized Model  
We propose a formal model of negotiation over attribution rights, which both summarizes the 
stylized facts derived from the literature and develop the proposition for the empirical analysis. We 
proceed as follows. We first describe the model and discuss its assumptions (3.1); then we derive the 
conditions for exclusion from inventorship (3.2), to be tested in sections 4 and 5. Welfare implications are 
discussed in section 3.3.  
7 Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), as well as rules followed by EPO, patent applications remain secret until the 
publication of the search report, a document produced by the patent examiner that assesses the novelty and non-obviousness of 
the patent claims. For non-PCT applications at USPTO, secrecy may last until the patent is granted, that is several years after 
the filing date. The refereeing and publication process at scientific journals is much shorter, and in any case does not impede the 
circulation of working papers and conference proceedings. Besides, no established diffusion channels and procedures exist for 
not-yet-published patents. 
8 Notice that this type of gender bias in patenting comes on top of the well-documented gender bias in scientific productivity 
and academic career opportunities. As far as our analysis is concerned, the latter may affect women scientists' type of 
contribution to research resulting in joint patents and papers, which we expect to be reflected by the scientist's position in the 
author by-line. We will confront this problem when discussing the specification of our econometric model. 
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3.1 Assumptions 
The model formalizes a bargaining process over attribution rights between two scientists 
that assign different values to authorship and inventorship, and face litigation costs. In 
particular we consider a team composed of two focal scientists, senior S (the team leader) and 
junior J, plus an indefinite number of other scientists or technicians, for whom notation is not 
necessary as they do not enter the negotiations. We initially ignore gender issues, which justifies 
our use of male pronouns and adjectives for both scientists.  
The team produces research findings that originate both a scientific publication and a 
patent. S and J are the team members who contribute more than anybody else to the research 
effort, and yet one of the two (either S or J) contributes more than the other9. They engage in 
negotiations to decide who will be first author of the publication and, jointly, on who will appear 
as inventor on the patent..   As far as authorship is concerned, the two scientists face different 
alternative (“non first”) positions. For S, this is the last position in the paper (which would 
signal at least his role as project leader), for J it is any intermediate position between first and 
last10. As for inventorship, name ordering does not matter, so S and J must simply decide 
whether to share it by listing both their names on the patent, or to exclude one of them from the 
list. S and J play a non-cooperative game with complete information. For simplicity, we assume 
that S, being the team leader, has all the bargaining power, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
to J.  S' strategy (that is, his proposal to J) is composed of two parts: one part concerns who 
should be first on the paper (respectively, 1S or 1J), while the other consists of the list of 
inventor (S, J or JS). Then, for instance, (1S, JS) is a proposal according to which S is the first 
author, and both J and S appear as inventors on the patent.  
We indicate the economic value of authorship with R, and that of inventorship with v. 
Following our discussion in section 2.4, we assume that the value of authorship differs for S and 
J. Formally, 𝑅1
𝑆 and 𝑅𝑁1𝑆  (with 𝑅1𝑆 ≥ 𝑅𝑁1𝑆  ) represent the benefits from authorship for S as “first” 
and “non first” author. Similarly 𝑅1
𝐽  and  𝑅𝑁1
𝐽   (with 𝑅1𝐽 ≥ 𝑅𝑁1𝐽 ) represent the benefits for J. As 
for the value of inventorship, we assume it, for sake of simplicity, to be the same for S and J, and 
to be either v (in case one of the two is the only one listed as inventor on the patent), 𝑣
2
 (shared 
inventorship), or zero (exclusion from inventorship). On one hand, this assumption is not 
9 Apart from S’ leadership role, we do not distinguish between types of contribution (conception, execution etc), but simply 
assume that team members who contribute less are less qualified for getting both first authorship and inventorship (more details 
below). We also ignore all issues of team formation and research strategy (but see our discussion of welfare implications) and we 
do not consider explicitly the decision on the type of research to undertake and whether to patent or not. 
10 We assume that if S becomes the first author, he may dispose of the last position in favour of any non-focal team member 
more senior than J. Otherwise, non-focal team members will always appear in intermediate positions in the authors’ by-line of 
the publication, or not appear at all. For simplicity, we also assume they will never be granted inventorship. As for J, he will get 
last authorship only if member of a two-member team along with S. In this case, however, last authorship can be hardly 
interpreted as signal of research leadership, so it is much less valuable than first authorship.   
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restrictive, because for most results what matters is the comparison between benefits of publications 
(which are individual-specific) and patent value. On the other hand, the model can be easily extended to 
patent values which differ across scientists.  
The key assumption of our model is that first authorship’s value (relative to inventorship) is 
“high” for J and “low” for S. In particular we assume that: 
(i) 𝑅1𝑆 − 𝑅𝑁1𝑆 < 𝑣2    ;   and  
(ii)  𝑅1
𝐽 − 𝑅𝑁1
𝐽 > 𝑣
2
 .  
Finally, 𝐿𝐽 represents the “litigation” cost faced by J when refusing S' proposal. For simplicity, we 
assume this to be the same, whether the proposal violates the social norms on authorship, the legal ones 
on inventorship, or both. The assumption is reasonable to the extent that these costs depend upon the 
risk of compromising his relationship with a potential mentor and the ensuing damage to his career, as 
discussed in section 2.4. As for 𝐿𝑆(the litigation costs incurred into by S when his proposal goes against 
the norm and it is refused by J) we assume it to consist first and foremost in a reputational loss, linked to 
the fact that J's refusal may give publicity to S' deviation from norms.11 
When evaluating the proposal by S and the opportunity to refuse it, J compares it to the 
prescriptions of the legal norms on inventorship and the social norms on authorships, based upon the 
two scientists’ relative contributions to the research effort These prescriptions identify the “outside 
option” that J can implement (at a cost), by rejecting the proposal (this action is denoted with NA). In 
case the proposal is accepted (action A) the corresponding payoff depends solely on the authorship and 
inventorship value implied by the proposal. Four possible cases (a. to d.) must be considered: 
• If J has contributed more than S to the project, but S has contributed enough to deserve 
inventorship; 
a. J should appear as first author on the paper and both J and S should appear on the 
patent; or 
b. J should appear as first author and as the only inventor. 
• If S has contributed more than J to the project, but J has contributed enough to deserve 
inventorship; 
c.  S should appear as  first author and both should appear on the patent; or 
d. S should appear as the first author and as the only inventor. 
Coherently with the discussion on legal and social norms on attribution rights (see section 2.3) 
these are the only four plausible cases to be considered. According to the norms it is not conceivable that 
inventorship is granted and authorship is not. 
11 As a matter of fact, the exact value and interpretation of LS is irrelevant, as long as it is positive, since its role is to make S 
strictly preferring  a norm-abiding proposal to a non-abiding one, if rejected. 
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Following standard practices in two-stage games with complete information, the solution 
concept is subgame perfection. Figures from A1 to A4 in the Additional Material report the game 
in extensive form for cases a. to d., respectively 
3.2 Results and empirical implications 
We can derive from our model a number of propositions on the distribution of attribution rights 
as a function of team members’ contribution to research and personal characteristics (seniority and 
gender). We focus here on just one of them, which summarizes the equilibria of the game in terms of 
exclusion from inventorship of either S or J and lends itself to being tested with bibliometric data (for a 
complete list of propositions and their proofs, see the Additional Material).  
 
Proposition. In equilibrium: 
1. S is never excluded from inventorship if listed as first author. He can be excluded only if he has 
contributed to the project less than J and his exclusion is in accordance with legal norms (case b) 
and J’s litigation costs are low (𝐿𝐽 < 𝑣
2
); in which case, he will appear as last author.  
2. J can be excluded when listed as first author, under the condition:  𝑣
2
< 𝐿𝐽 < 𝑣
2
+𝑅1𝐽 − 𝑅𝑁1𝐽 . J is 
always excluded from the patent when he is not listed as first author. 
 
The proposition implies that exclusion from inventorship is not merely driven by legal norms. 
This would be the case if authors listed as first authors were never excluded. However, a junior 
scientist may end up being excluded from inventorship even if listed as first author, for intermediate 
values of litigations costs. This is never the case for his senior. In other words, when it comes to 
attribution rights, seniority matters. This result is intuitively explained by S’ and J’s different 
preferences for publications and patents, as captured by the assumptions (i) and (ii) introduced 
above. By granting J the first authorship while at the same time excluding him from the patent, S 
can maximize his economic return from the invention, while at the same time letting J obtain what 
is most valuable to him. The deal is sustainable for a relatively wide range of J’s litigation costs.12   
Notice that seniority matters not only because junior scientists are more at risk of exclusion 
from inventorship, irrespective of their contribution, but also because senior scientists end up being 
12 Another way of looking at this result is that J can obtain the first position in the paper, although S has all the bargaining 
power and litigation cost are large (albeit not too large, as they have an upper bound).  This point is discussed by the literature 
on multiple issue bargaining (e.g. Fershtman, 1990), where it has been shown that simultaneous bargaining on several items for 
which agents have different preferences can yield Pareto improvements. In the context of our model, it can be shown that there 
are values of 𝐿𝐽for which, given the scientific contribution, J would not get first authorship if  he and S had the possibility to 
bargain over scientific authorship only, and would otherwise get it in case the bargaining included inventorship, too. 
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excluded only when juniors face low litigation costs 𝐿𝐽. This implies that senior scientists have a lower 
probability of being excluded from inventorship, irrespective of their contribution. 
Still, our results imply that a correlation exists between an author’s position in the paper’s by-line 
line and the probability of exclusion. S is never excluded when he is first author, and, when last, he is 
is excluded only for low values of 𝐿𝐽; while J is always excluded when he is not the first author.  
Gender is a factor that we do not explicitly include in our model. However, following the analogy 
analogy between junior and female scientists we drew in section 2.4, gender issues can be accommodated 
by assuming that female scientists assign either lower value to inventorship or higher value to first 
authorship than their male colleagues. The former hypothesis can be accommodated in the model by 
specifying scientist-specific values of v. The latter corresponds to a higher value of 𝑅1
𝐽−𝑅𝑁1
𝐽 . This makes it 
more likely to meet the condition (ii) , under which the scientist accepts exclusion from the patent, while 
getting first authorship.  
3.3. Welfare implications  
Our model  implies the existence of two potential sources of welfare losses, the first one affecting 
third parties, the second concerning the research team members. Further losses may appear, albeit 
indirectly, as a result of S’ and J’s choice of the research projects to undertake, on the basis of their 
expectations concerning the outcome of negotiations over attribution rights.  
First, third parties (e.g. recruiting companies and institutions, funding agencies) suffer a welfare 
loss under all equilibria in which legal and social norms are violated. This is because they receive a wrong 
signal and may end up recruiting or supporting an under-performing scientist. 
Second, J will suffer a welfare loss whenever he has contributed the most to the research effort, 
so that he should get first authorship according to social norms, but gives it up when facing high values 
of 𝐿𝐽. In this case, the violation of norms leads to a decrease of overall utility of team members (see the 
Additional Material for proof). The intuitive explanation of this result is straightforward: while the 
allocation of inventorship is irrelevant (the total value for the team is v in any case), the marginal value 
of first authorship is higher for J than for S, so that any change of the name ordering in the publication 
decreases the total utility of the team. 13 
Third, more losses may materialize whenever S’ and J’s ex ante choice of research projects is 
affected by their expectations of negotiation’s outcome. Suppose that, whenever they undertake a 
research project, S and J sustain a sunk cost (in terms of time, resources, etc). Suppose also that this 
occurs before attribution rights are negotiated, but with rational expectations on the equilibrium 
13 The opposite holds when it is S who contributes the most to the project. In this case the utility of the team weakly increases 
when the attribution rights are not those put forth by norms. In this case, the third parties’ welfare loss may be (at least 
partially) compensated by the team’s gain. 
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outcome of negotiations. Under these circumstances, the scientists will be willing to participate 
only to projects whose benefits, in terms of attribution rights, are higher than the sunk cost14.  
Consider first the case in which J provides the largest contribution to the project. 
According to our model, any departure from the norms (S as first author or J excluded from the 
patent) makes S better off, and J (weakly) worse off. As a consequence, there will be a number of 
projects, which require relatively high sunk costs by J, that will  not be initiated, due to J’s 
refusal to join in, while they would have been under a norm-abiding distribution of attribution 
rights.  However, when the largest contribution comes from S, both S and J are better off under 
the norm-deviating equilibrium (J as first author) and end up undertaking more projects than 
otherwise.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Our empirical methodology makes use of bibliometric data and is based on the identification of 
patent-publication pairs (PPPs). Theoretically, a patent and a paper form a pair when they represent an 
instance of "simultaneous disclosure" of a set of research results having both scientific interest and 
commercial value (Gans et al., 2011). Empirically, we define a patent and a paper to form a pair when 
the same idea is described to some extent in both documents, and at least one author and one inventor 
are the same person. Scientific papers and patents differ widely in contents. The former describe a set of 
theories and/or experimental results, and emphasize the originality and neatness of the results, whereas 
the latter describe the features of a new product or process, of which they emphasize the novelty and 
utility, by laying out a list of claims. However, in “science-based” technologies and engineering, it is 
often the case that a patentable advancement is also worth publishing in refereed journals. In this case, 
we may expect highly specific words to be present in both documents.  
Over the last ten years, several papers have been published, which make use of PPP datasets 
built more or less manually. Ducor (2000) performed a manual search of various databases for proteins 
with specific genetic or aminoacid sequences, finding 40 pairs. Murray’s (2002) study concerned a single 
patent-paper pair on tissue engineering in cartilage. Murray and Stern (2007 and 2008) compared 340 
articles published in Nature Biotechnology between 1997 and 1999 with their authors’ patents at the 
USPTO, ending up with 169 PPPs, all of them selected through careful reading of both types of 
documents. The number of patents and publications needed for our analysis is so large that we could not 
rely on manual search and reading. So we applied established methods of data mining and information 
retrieval, as follows: 
14 Let us assume also that the investment required to S is low enough, and therefore S will always be willing to participate to 
the project. 
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(1) From the KEINS patent database, we extracted all Italian academic inventors from the four 
academic disciplines with the highest propensity to patent, namely: Chemical Engineering, 
Biology, Pharmacology, and Electronic Engineering & Telecommunications. These are 218 
individuals, who appear as inventors in 389 EPO patent applications from 1978 to 2001.15 
(2) For the selected academic inventors, we collected all publication data from the ISI-Web of Science 
(ISI-WoS), from 1975 to 2003.16 
(3) Based upon titles and abstracts, we matched the selected academic inventors’ patents to their 
scientific articles, thus obtaining a pool of patent-publication pairs (PPPs). More details on this in 
the following section. 
(4) Again from ISI-WoS, we collected all the publication data for the academic inventors’ co-authors, 
in order to establish the latter's first year of activity (first year in which a publication in their 
names appears in ISI-WoS) and their number of publications.17    
(5) We established the gender of as many as possible co-authors (841 out of 899), by manually 
retrieving their publications and looking at first names.  
4.1 Patent-publication pairs: methodology 
Given t the priority year of a patent and i one of the its inventors, a potential patent-publication 
pair is defined as the association between the patent and a publication that has i among its co-authors 
and has been published in the period [t-2, t+2]. After excluding all duplications (which may occur when 
two or more patents or two or more publications have the same co-inventors or co-authors and title), all 
publications with no abstracts, and all patents which their inventors declared to be unrelated to any 
publication of theirs, the final sample of potential patent-publication pairs is composed of 6810 pairs, 389 
patents and 2838 publications.18 
For all documents in this potential PPP set we examined the title and abstract, and transformed 
them into comparable information sets. The first step of the transformation consisted in removing 
15 The KEINS database contains information on all academic scientists designated as inventors on EPO patent applications 
filed either by universities, public research organizations or business companies, for a number of European countries (Lissoni et 
al., 2006 and 2008). It also contains information on individual characteristics of the scientists (such as age, affiliation, academic 
rank, discipline), as well as any information from the front page of their patents (priority dates, titles, abstracts, and applicants' 
names). Italian scientists listed in the KEINS database include professors from all ranks (assistant, associate and full), but no 
PhD students, post-docs or other non-tenured faculty.  
16 More details on these data in Breschi et al. (2007, and 2008).  
17 Due to problems of homonymy we selected, for each co-author's name, only the publications in fields "similar" to those of the 
related academic inventors (for a total of 99 fields). In order to do so, we applied a methodology proposed by Engelsman and 
Van Raan (1992) and Breschi et al, (2003). We report it in Box 1 in the Additional Material. 
18Academic inventors’ declarations on the existence of publications related to their patents were collected by means of 
structured phone interviews. Among other things, interviewees were asked, with reference to each of their patents, whether or 
not they had published any related research results. Responses were obtained from 154 out of 308 inventors, for a total of 372 
patents out of 552. Overall, interviewees confirmed the existence of a patent-related publication for 86% of the patents.  
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uninformative terms such as pronouns, conjunctions, and the most frequent nouns and verbs ("stop 
words") from both titles and abstracts.  
In the second step, we applied a traditional data-mining technique, the bag of words method 
(Salton and McGill, 1983; Leopold et al., 2004). For each disciplinary field we built a complete set of 
words from the titles and abstracts of all the patents and publications, so that each document j (patent 
or publication) could be represented by a vector. Each cell (i,j) in the vector has a value equal to 1 if 
word i appears in document j, and 0 otherwise (Bassecoulard and Zitt, 2004). This vector representation 
may be used to produce a large number of “similarity measures” between patents and publications. The 
most common one, which we adopted, is the cosine similarity measure (Cos).  
If xij is the value of the binary variable for document j and word i, Cos measures the similarity 
between a document k and s as follows:   
∑∑∑=
i
si
i
ki
i
siki xxxxskCos
22),(  
Theoretical values of Cos are in the continuous [0,1] range. In our application, Cos takes values 
comprised between 0 and 0.75. For our analysis, we selected those PPPs whose Cos value falls in the top 
10% of the distribution, which is comprised between 0.145 and the maximum, for a total of 680 PPPs, 
resulting from 213 patents, 1138 different authors and 450 publications.19  
It is important to note that, differently from manual methodologies, our bibliometric approach 
does not presume a one-to-one match between patents and publications (one patent corresponding to 
just one publication, and vice versa). On the contrary, we produce a large number of one-patent-to-many-
publications matches, and several many-to-many ones. This is not unexpected: a good research project 
will certainly produce more than one result worth of publication, and possibly more than one patent. 20  
The large number of PPPs derived from one-to-many and many-to-many matches suggests that 
the appropriate unit of analysis may be the overall team of authors (inventors) listed in a set of related 
publications (patents). This is because, within a research team, the negotiation of authorship and 
inventorship may refer not to the single item (publication or patent) but to the overall set: for example, 
an author who has been excluded from one patent can be included in a related one.  
19 Table A1 in the Additional Material gives an example of a PPP. In order to check the robustness of the matching method we 
also used three other selection methods to find the actual patent-publication pairs, which we describe in Box A2 in the 
Additional Material. The descriptive results we obtained did not change much and are available on request. 
20 One-to-one matches produce 44 PPPs out of 680. As for one-to-many matches, they involve 76 patents matched to 271 
publications, and originate 271 PPPs. Many-to-many matches account for a total of 346 PPPs. The many-patents-to-one-
publication case is much rarer, with 6 publications associated with 20 patents, for a total of 20 PPPs. It is likely that scientists 
facing patentable research results will tend to publish them separately (in order to keep the length of articles under control, or to 
follow a “salami slicing” strategy), but to patent them jointly. In fact, the patent fee structure provides many incentives to pool 
several claims into a single application. 
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Aware of this possibility, in the empirical analysis we mainly use our selected 680 PPPs as 
distinct units of analysis, but, we also run a set of additional regressions in which the unit is the set of all 
patents linked to one publication, either from one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many matches.  
4.2 Model and main variables 
As we estimate the probability of an author’s exclusion from inventorship, we arrange the 
database accordingly. In particular, each PPP j is repeated as many times as the total number of 
authors appearing on the publication(s) included in j. So for each author i and PPP j we know whether 
he/she is excluded or not from the patent related to PPP j. We model the probability of exclusion as a 
function of both the author’s contribution to the research effort and her personal (biographical, 
professional) characteristics. Our dependent variable y is the exclusion event, with yij=1 if author i of a 
publication in PPP j is excluded from the inventorship of a patent in the same PPP, and yij=0 otherwise. 
Pr(yij=1|x) is the probability that author i is excluded from a patent in PPP j, conditional on a set of 
variables x that describe the characteristics either of the author or of the PPP.  
The author's characteristics we consider are: 
-  The author's position in the by-line, transformed into three dummy variables: FIRST, LAST, and 
MIDDLE (reference case). Following the discussion in section 2 and the model in section 3, we 
expect both FIRST and LAST to bear a negative sign.21  
-  Seniority, measured either in absolute terms or relative to the other authors of the publication. We 
measure author i’s absolute SENIORITY as the difference between the priority year of patent in 
PPP j (time of the invention tpatj) and the year of the author’s first publication (tfpi). As for relative 
seniority, we measure it with a continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 1, defined as: 
RELATIVE SENIORITYij=(tfpi -t0j)/(t1j-t0j) 
where t0j and t1j are the years of the first publication of, respectively, the most and the least 
experienced among all the authors of the publication in PPP j. Alternatively, we measure relative 
seniority with two dummy variables, MOST_SENIOR and MOST_JUNIOR, which take value 
21 The information provided by the name order of authors may vary between papers co-authored by several members of one 
research team, and papers co-authored by authors from several teams. In the latter case, authors may be listed first according to 
the team they belong to (with teams ordered either according to criteria we ignore) and then either alphabetically or according 
to the within-the-team negotiation outcome (substantive order). In the case of team+alphabetical order, our dummies cannot be 
interpreted any more as proxies of the individual's contribution. In the case of team+substantive order, the FIRST and LAST 
dummies still bear an unequivocal meaning (they indicate respectively the first author in the first team listed, and the last 
author in the last team listed), but have less explanatory power, because authors in middle position comprise also many authors 
listed as first and last by other teams, alongside with genuine "middle" authors, that is authors who have provided more limited 
contributions. Our data do not allow us to control directly for the number of teams behind each paper, but only for the number of 
affiliations listed on each paper. This is because for most publications in ISI WoS, until recently, authors and affiliations were 
listed in separate fields, with no keys to connect them (in addition, it is often the case that one author has multiple affiliations). 
We checked the robustness of our results by running a set of regressions also on a restricted sample that includes only the 
publications with multiple affiliations. The results do not change in any meaningful way and are available on request. 
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one, respectively, for RELATIVE SENIORITY=1 and RELATIVE SENIORITY=0. We expect 
SENIORITY, RELATIVE_SENIORITY and MOST_SENIOR to bear a negative sign, and 
MOST_JUNIOR to bear a positive one. 
- Professional experience, measured in either absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms, we use 
the stock of individual i’s publications (PUB_STOCKi) one year before the patent’s priority date 
(tpatj-1). In relative terms, we build a continuous variable, ranging from one to zero: 
RELATIVE_PUB_STOCKijtpat = 
= (PUB_STOCKtpati-PUB_STOCKtpat0j)/( PUB_STOCKtpat1j-PUB_STOCKtpat0j) 
where PUB_STOCK1j and PUB_STOCK0j are respectively the highest and lowest PUB_STOCK 
values among all the authors in PPP j. Alternatively, we employ two dummies for the scientists 
with the highest and lowest scientific experience (TOP_SCHOLAR, BOTTOM_SCHOLAR).  
Professional experience is informative of a scientist's skills and rank, and as such it should decrease 
the probability of exclusion from inventorship. In fact we expect technicians in the research team 
to have a smaller publication stock than other team members; accordingly if included in the 
authors' by-line (a potential instance of gift authorship), they have a higher probability to be 
excluded from the patent. At the same time, however, the authors' by-line may include scientists 
of great reputation, but who have not contributed much to the research (guest authorship, as 
discussed in section 2.2). Guest authors may be included to increase the publication's visibility, or 
out of deference towards important members of a department; but they can hardly claim any stake 
in the patent. In this case, we expect professional experience to increase the probability of 
exclusion. It follows that we cannot put forward strong a priori on the sign of PUB_STOCK, 
RELATIVE_PUB_STOCK and TOP/BOTTOM_SCHOLAR. 
- Authors’ gender, as represented by the dummy variable FEMALE. Following the discussion in 
Section 3 we expect a positive effect of FEMALE on the probability of exclusion. However, gender 
and contribution may be correlated, to the extent that female authors who appear in the MIDDLE 
position of a publication by-line may be more peripheral team members, and have contributed less 
to the research results than other authors in the same position. The same does not apply to women 
in FIRST and LAST positions, since such positions can be assigned to one author only and provide 
non-ambiguous information. Thus, we will also interact gender and contribution dummies. We 
expect the coefficients for FIRST*FEMALE and LAST*FEMALE to be greater than the 
coefficients for, respectively, FIRST*MALE and LAST*MALE, and we can safely interpret the 
difference as entirely due to gender. We also expect the coefficients for MIDDLE*FEMALE to be 
positive, but this may be due to either contribution or gender. 
As for the characteristics of each PPP, we control for: 
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- The number of authors of the publication in PPP j (N_AUTj): the larger the team of scientists, the 
higher the probability that some authors will be excluded, due to dilution of contributions. 
- The academic inventor’s discipline (dummies for ELECTRONICS, PHARMACOLOGY, 
BIOLOGY and CHEMISTRY), which we presume to be the same as that of co-authors.22  
- The difference between the publication year and the priority year of the patent (DELTA_YEARj = 
tpubj -tpatj), which controls for the accuracy of our matching exercise, and reflect the scientists’ 
patenting strategies (see discussion in section 5.3 below). 
- Time dummies for the priority years of patents, which capture any change over time in the practice 
of listing inventors in patents or authors in publications. 
 
5. Results 
The database that results from the different steps described in the previous section is composed 
of 680 PPs and 3333 observations. Clearly the same publications and patents may belong to different 
PPPs and each scientist may enter the sample more than once if he/she has more than one publication, 
and/or these are related to more than one patent.23 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the number of patents and publications in the selected (actual) PPP sample, by 
priority year and technological field. It reports also the number of authors by field. Figure 1 shows the 
observed frequencies of the number of authors and inventors in each of the 450 individual publications 
and 213 individual patents in the PPP sample. The distribution of the number of authors has a fatter 
tail to the right.  
 
[Table 1  and Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows that the average number of inventors per PPP is 3.35, while the average number 
of authors is equal to 4.9, for a resulting difference of 1.54. Table 2 also reports similar information for 
the initial set of original (potential) PPPs: notice that, due to a much less precise matching between 
22 As an alternative, we experimented with journal dummies, also because journals may differ in their tolerance of authorship 
inflation. The results did not change at all, so we do not report them, but they are available on request. 
23 If scientist i is the author of two publications, both related to the same patent B, he/she will enter our database twice; if 
scientist i is the author of two publications, both of them related to patents A and B, he/she will enter our database 4 times; if 
scientist i is the author of one publication related to just one patent, he/she will enter our database just once; the latter is the 
most common case that covers 32.3% of the number of observations. 
 17 
                                                          
patents and publications, the average values of the number of authors and inventors are higher than in 
the actual PPP sample, as it is the average difference between the two (4.89 instead of 1.54). 
 
[TABLE 2 here] 
 
These results are consistent with the existence of an exclusion process.24 However, we observe 
significant differences across disciplines. Table 2 shows that the average author-inventor difference is 
significantly greater than zero only in Biology and Pharmacology. In Chemical Engineering & Material 
Technology and in Electronics & Telecommunications we find that the average number of authors and 
inventors are roughly the same, and the median value of the difference across PPPs is equal to 0. 
 
[TABLE 3 here] 
[TABLE 4 here] 
 
 In order to investigate whether a specific pattern of exclusion emerges, in Table 3 we report the number 
of publications by number of authors, and calculate the number of authors in each position of the by-line 
(FIRST, LAST and MEDIUM).  
Table 4 reports similar information, but it distinguishes between authors who have been included and 
excluded from the PPP-related patents. It shows that authors in the LAST position have the lowest 
frequency of exclusion, followed by those in FIRST. Authors in MIDDLE positions are more often 
excluded. When considering the four disciplinary fields separately, we do not detect any significant 
difference across fields.25  
5.2 Estimation results  
The sample we use for the estimation is built as follows. Starting from the selected 680 PPPs we 
exclude: (1) all publications with only one author; (2) all the publications whose author by-line is in 
alphabetical order or with a number of inventors greater than or equal to the number of authors; (3) all 
the academic inventors from the KEINS database, for which the probability of being excluded is zero by 
24 For all many-to-many PPPs, we also counted the total number of authors and inventors and checked whether an exclusion 
pattern at the group level could be detected. The results we obtained are very close to those of Figure 1 and Table 2: this means 
that even when the same publication is related to more than one patent, it often happens that one or more co-authors are 
excluded from all patents. 
25 Results available on request. 
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construction;26 and (4) two publications whose number of authors made the data collection effort 
daunting (36 and 42 authors, respectively). This leaves us with 476 patent-publication pairs, 186 
patents, 326 publications and 929 authors (540 men, 330 women, and 59 for whom gender is unknown). 
The resulting sample contains 1997 observations (1897 of which have non-missing gender information). 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics.27 The overall percentage of exclusions in our sample is 83%. 
Notice that women account for 37% of the observations and most of them have a middle position in the 
by-line (no position or exclusion pattern has been detected for observations with missing gender value). 
 
[TABLE 5 here] 
 
The correlation matrix between the main variables is displayed in the Appendix (Table A2). The 
dependent variable exhibits all the expected correlations with the covariates. The correlation between 
measures of seniority and experience is high, as it is the correlation between the absolute and relative 
measures of each variable. Finally, SENIORITY and PUB_STOCK are correlated with FIRST and 
LAST, respectively with a negative and a positive sign, as expected. 
Table 6 displays the results of a set of Logit regressions where the dependent variable is the 
probability of an author's exclusion from the inventorship of a related patent. We assume that 
observations are independent across individuals, but not necessarily across publications and patents by 
the same individual scientists; therefore we cluster errors by individual. We include dummies for the 
calendar year and for the disciplinary field. 
Column (1) reports the basic regression. In columns (2) and (3) we substitute controls for the 
authors’ seniority and scientific experience with similar controls, but relative to the other co-authors, 
either as continuous variables or dummies. Column (4)-(5) and (6) replicate column (1), (2) and (3), but 
with the addition of a control for gender (FEMALE). Column (7) also controls for gender, interacted 
with the information on the author's position in the by-line (MIDDLE*MALE is the reference case). 
 
[TABLE 6 and 7 here] 
 
26 The academic inventors from KEINS are excluded from the regression sample only when they serve as a starting point for the 
PPP’s construction. Conversely they are kept in the sample if they appear as co-authors in other publications and are not 
excluded from the related patent.  
27 There are 17 observations related to 13 publications with only two authors. We kept these observations in the sample. Their 
exclusion does not change the econometric results in any respect. 
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Our results show that both first and last authors have a significantly lower probability of being 
excluded from inventorship than middle authors. This result holds across all specifications in Table 6. 
Also first authors are less likely to be excluded than last ones. In Table 7 we calculate the changes in the 
predicted probability of exclusion for a discrete change in FIRST and LAST (with all other variables 
held at their mean value), based upon regression (1) in Table 6: we obtain values equal to -0.16 and -0.12, 
respectively.28  
These results are coherent both with the legal rules on inventorship we examined in section 2 and 
the equilibria of our negotiation model. The former state that inventorship must be awarded to team 
members who contribute most to the research project, while the latter indicate that, after negotiation, a 
correlation exists between the authors’ position in the by-line and their probability to get inventorship. 
Table 6 also shows that the probability of exclusion decreases significantly with the scientist’s 
years of activity, as expected from our model’s treatment of seniority. In specifications (1) and (4), the 
estimated coefficient of SENIORITY is negative and significantly different from zero; the same applies 
to RELATIVE_SENIORITY, in columns (3) and (6). These results are confirmed when we use relative 
measures of seniority and experience, the coefficients for MOST_JUNIOR and 
RELATIVE_SENIORITY being significantly negative.  
Table 8 reports the predicted probabilities of exclusion based upon regression (1) in Table 6, for 
different levels of SENIORITY. The analysis of the marginal effect of SENIORITY for individuals who 
are first in the by-line shows that the first ten years of activity decrease the probability of exclusion by 
approximately 0.13. The same analysis for individuals who are last in the by-line suggests that the same 
increase in seniority decreases the probability of exclusion by approximately 0.14. The following ten 
years of activity (that is, from the 10th to the 20th) reduce the probability of exclusion of first and last 
authors respectively by 0.20 and 0.23.  
 
[TABLE 8 here] 
 
These results indicate that, given the position in the by-line, a junior scientist is significantly 
more at risk of being excluded from inventorship than a senior one. Among authors who are first in the 
by-line, a 10-year increase in seniority gives a substantial premium in terms of reduced probability of 
exclusion. This is coherent with our negotiation model, where it showed that when senior scientist S gets 
first authorship he will also get inventorship, while the same does not apply to junior scientist J. 
28 These values are similar to the marginal effects derived from estimating the same specification with a linear probability model 
that fully confirms results shown in Table 6. 
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Last authors also benefit greatly from seniority: a 10-year increase in publication activity 
provides them with a substantial premium in terms of reduced probability of exclusion from the patent. 
Again, this is coherent with our model, where it suggests that last authorship may not go with 
inventorship in two cases: when it goes to S and S cannot illegitimately reclaim inventorship, due to J’s 
low litigation costs; or when S gets first inventorship and concedes last authorship to either J or a non 
focal team member. In the first case, J’s litigation cost may be low because S is not so senior (J cannot 
count so much upon him for mentorship). In the second case, it is likely that the team member who gets 
last authorship is more junior than S (he certainly is if he is J). 
Regressions (4)-(6) in Table 6 show that women are significantly more at risk of being excluded 
from the patent than men. Depending on the specification, the estimated coefficient for FEMALE range 
between 0.72 and 0.84.  
When we interact gender and the position in the by-line (regression (7) in Table 6) we find that 
women in MIDDLE position are more at risk of exclusion than men in the same position. In this case, it 
may be that MIDDLE-placed women are excluded because they contributed less than men in the same 
position. However, we also find that women in FIRST and LAST positions have a higher probability of 
exclusion than men in the same positions, which suggests that gender effects is independent from the 
individual contribution, as suggested by the extension of our model to gender.29 
Finally, PUB_STOCK is slightly positive and RELATIVE_PUB_STOCK is positive and 
significant, conditional on seniority, which means that the scientists with the larger stock of publication 
in the team are more likely to be excluded from inventorship. In line with our discussion in Sections 2 
and 4, we interpret it as evidence of guest authorship practices involving well-reputed scientists (with 
guest authors more likely to be excluded from the patent).  
5.3 Robustness checks 
The high number of one-to-many and many-to-many patent-publication matches suggests that 
negotiations within a team may refer to an entire set of related publications and patents, and not just to 
one item at a time. Therefore, we  performed a subsidiary exercise in which the exclusion event concerns 
the whole set of patents matched to one single publication in the PPP.  
Table 9 reports the results of a set of regressions, identical to those in Table 6 but for the 
definition of  Pr(yij=1|x), which reads now as the conditional probability that author i is excluded, not 
29 Following a referee's request, we have also considered a specification with interaction effects between the author's position 
and both seniority and the disciplinary dummies. We estimated the effects according to Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al 
(2004) and found them never significant for position interacted with seniority, and significantly positive for the interaction 
between FIRST and PHARMA and between LAST and ELECTRONICS. This means that in these two cases the results 
displayed in Table 6 are somewhat weaker Full results are available on request. In any case, in logit models, interaction effects 
are present also when the coefficient of the interaction terms is assumed to be zero, due to non-linearity.  
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just from one patent, but from all the patents related to his/her publication (that is, j does not represent 
one of the patents related to i’s publication, but the entire set of patents related to it). 
 
[TABLE 9 here] 
 
The sign and significance of the estimated parameters for FIRST does not change, although their 
magnitude decreases. Also, the estimated parameter for LAST maintains its sign. All estimated 
coefficients for seniority and experience, both absolute and relative, maintain their sign and significance, 
with the only exception of DELTA_YEARS. The gender effect remains very strong, its estimated 
coefficient being larger than in Table 6. When we interact gender and position in the by-line, the 
coefficients maintain their sign and significance (with the exclusion of LAST*MALE). We conclude that, 
when altering our definition of “exclusion from inventorship”, the core of our results remains unchanged.  
A second possible cause of concern is the potential mix, in our PPP sample, of both false 
positives (unrelated patents and publications in same PPP) and false negatives (unrelated patents and 
publications we failed to identify as such). In particular, false positives could produce a positive bias of 
the estimated coefficients of LAST, as well as variables related to seniority and professional experience. 
This is because typically senior and more productive authors (who, as we have seen, are more likely to be  
LAST) sign more papers than junior scientists. 
In order to control for this potential problem, we restrict our sample to the PPPs with a Cos 
similarity score in the top 5% of the distribution. This reduces the risk of false positives and leaves us 
with only 341 PPPs, with a minimal value of Cos equal to 0.174. We then run a set of regressions 
identical to those of Table 6. Our results (Table 10) confirm the negative sign of SENIORITY (or, 
alternatively, of RELATIVE_SENIORITY), with a slight increase in the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient. In addition, the estimated coefficients FIRST and LAST maintain their sign and 
significance, with the estimated effect of LAST being larger. We also find a stronger positive effect of 
PUB_STOCK on the probability of exclusion. Finally, the estimated gender effects are coherent with 
what found in Table 6.30 
 
[TABLE 10 here] 
 
30 If we raise the bar further, and select only the PPPs whose similarity scores fall within the top 1% of the distribution 
(minimal level of Cos at 0.25), we still obtain similar results. In this case we are left with 68 PPPs and 156 observations in the 
regression sample. In particular, estimated parameters from the Logit regression for FIRST, LAST and SENIORITY become, 
respectively, -2.25***, -2.35*** and -0.19***. The complete results are not displayed but are available on request. 
 22 
                                                          
We also consider a different way to restrict our sample of PPPs, which consists in selecting only 
the publications appearing after the priority date of the related patents, for which the variable 
DELTA_YEARS takes a null or positive value. The rationale behind this restriction is that research 
teams, especially if well advised from the legal viewpoint, are more likely to publish their papers after 
filing the patent, in order to avoid endangering its novelty. So, we suspect that PPPs where 
DELTA_YEARS<0 include more false positive than those for which DELTA_YEARS≥0.  
Table 11 replicates the Logit regression of column (1) of Table 6, for two different PPP samples, 
one for observations with DELTA_YEARS≥0, the other one for the complementary set of observations 
(DELTA_YEARS<0). 
 
[TABLES 11 here] 
 
The results for DELTA_YEARS≥0 are similar, in terms of sign and significance of the estimated 
parameters, to those of Table 6. The main difference consists only in the magnitude of FIRST and LAST 
parameters, which are respectively lower and higher than in Table 6 (the SENIORITY parameters also 
appear smaller). By contrast, the regression for DELTA_YEARS<0 returns a very high coefficient for 
FIRST and a non-significant one for LAST. This is consistent with the possibility that part of our results 
in Table 6 were affected by a bias due to the methodology followed for the creation of our PPP sample. 
Alternatively, we can explain the results of Table 11 with the possibility that, within a team of 
scientists, the decision to file a patent may follow two different routes, which affects differently the 
distribution of inventorship credits. Patents in PPPs with DELTA_YEARS≥0 may be the result of a 
route based on searching for IP protection from the very beginning of the research project, so that 
precautions were taken, including not publishing any research result before filing the patent application. 
Conversely, patents in PPPs with DELTA_YEARS<0 may be the result of a decision taken after finding 
some promising results. In this case, the patent may generate specific additional activity by the author 
who has contributed most to the research activity, who will then have higher chances both to be 
retained as first author and to get inventorship. This interpretation is consistent with the very high 
absolute value of the coefficient for FIRST (as opposed to the lack of significance for LAST) in the case 
of DELTA_YEARS<0. Note, however, that the observations with DELTA_YEARS<0 account for just 
one third of the sample.31 
 
31 This interpretation is coherent with findings by Breschi et al. (2008) and Azoulay et al. (2007) on the time sequencing of 
patents and publications by academic inventors.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of attribution rights distribution within 
scientific teams whose research results are diffused jointly through patents and publications. We first 
argued that social and legal norms concerning authorship and inventorship are of difficult interpretation 
and application to teams, which leaves room for negotiations among team members. We have then 
formalized the negotiation process with a stylized model involving two scientists (a junior and a senior 
one), who assign different values to first authorship and inventorship, have asymmetric bargaining 
power, and face litigation costs. Under these assumption, the negotiation process is described as a two-
stage game with perfect information, whose equilibrium outcomes suggest that the junior author may 
agree to give up his inventorship rights in order to secure first authorship, while the senior author, 
whenever gets first authorship, also retains inventorship. Results for the junior scientist can be 
intuitively extended to female ones. This amounts to say that seniority and gender matter, so that junior 
and female scientists have a higher probability to be excluded fro inventorship when facing high enough 
litigation costs.   
We then test this proposition on a new and original database composed of Patent-Publications 
Pairs by a set of Italian academics active in the 1990s-early 2000s. We find that first and last co-authors 
of a focal publication are less likely to be excluded from the related patent or patents, as suggested by 
legal norms on inventorship. But we also find that, ceteris paribus, junior and female co-authors are more 
likely to be excluded from a related patent, as predicted by our model. 
This implies that within-the-team negotiations may lead to allocations of attribution rights that 
do not reflect entirely the individual contributions to research advancements and inventions. As a 
consequence, society may incur into net welfare losses, which are not always compensated by within-the-
team efficiency gains. 
More generally, our results contribute to existing criticism directed at the obsolescence of the 
concept of scientific authorship, and extend it to that of inventorship. Despite the dramatic rise of 
teamwork, scientific attribution rights are still modelled upon views of discovery and invention as 
resulting from an individual spark of genius (Fisk, 2006). Some steps in the direction of abandoning 
authorship have been undertaken by several scientific journals, especially in the medical sciences, which 
now require authors not merely to identify themselves as such, but also to specify the exact contents of 
their contribution, according to pre-determined categories. "Contributorship" is suggested as an 
alternative to authorship (Rennie, 1998; Biagioli et al., 1999; Hwang, 2003).  
The legal figure of the inventor also dates back to a time – the XIX century – when the existence 
of patents had been put into question, and was defended by portraying intellectual property as an 
individual right, as well as by creating a public image of inventors as “heroes of the industrial 
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revolution" (MacLeod, 2008; see also Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Long, 1991; and Bracha, 2005). In 
that respect, our work applies not only to academic patenting, as it solicits an investigation on the 
overall adequacy of present norms on inventorship, also when applied to industrial R&D settings.  
Our paper contributes to the literature also from the technical viewpoint. First, it provides a 
formal economic treatment of negotiation over attribution rights, a topic that so far has been quite 
neglected by economists. One notable exception is Engers et al. (1999), who develop a model of 
bargaining over authors’ order in a paper, and show that alphabetic ordering (which is widespread in 
economics) can be a sustainable equilibrium (as opposed to the relative contribution ordering, more 
common in other disciplines). However, Engers et al. do not consider bargaining over inventorship, as we 
do, or the possibility of exclusions (from papers or patents). 
Second, we contribute to the emerging bibliometric literature on PPPs by proving the usefulness 
of text-mining techniques for matching patents and publications. Our application suggests that complex 
combinations of patents and publications are likely: one-to-one matches between individual patents and 
publications are less frequent than matches of several publications connected to a single patent or 
several patents. 
As for immediate extensions of our work, it would be of great interest to explore differences in 
attribution practices across academic institutions and countries (our results refer only to Italy, whose 
academic system assigns large discretionary power to seniors; see Pezzoni et al., 2012). The existence of 
cross-countries differences in authorship attribution is suggested by Hwang et al. (2002), who find that 
US scientists are more likely to comply with the ICMJE authorship guidelines than non-US ones. 
Similar differences may be found for inventorship. For example, Häussler and Sauermann (2013) 
replicate in part our exercise for a sample of British and German life scientists, but do not find any 
evidence of a relationship between the distribution of attribution rights and gender (while they find some 
for seniority). They also compare the behaviour of industry scientists to that of academics, and find no 
substantial differences. Further theorizing on this issue should take into account the different incentives 
to publishing and patenting of the two categories of researchers (Lacetera and Zirulia, 2012). 
Finally, our research questions can be extended to other fields of human creativity, in which – as 
in science – activities are increasingly performed by teams, but careers are built upon personal 
reputation, fuelled by attribution rights. In some of these fields, various forms of contributorship have 
emerged to fine-tune the information signals resulting from attribution. In movie-making, for example, 
the various professional figures contributing to the production of a film are awarded specialized credits 
(for directing, screenwriting, shooting etc.). This does not prevent the existence of some prestige ranking 
(as with directors vs. more technical figures), but it allows due credit to be distributed to all participants 
in the creative act. On the contrary, in fields such as design, architecture, or advertising, individual 
attribution rights are still the key form of attribution. In these cases, we may be interested to investigate 
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whether negotiations among team members occur, as in science; and what characteristics of the 
individuals affect their outcomes.  
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Table 1. Patents, publication, authors and inventors by field and priority years in the selected PPPs 
 Chemistry Electronics Pharma Biology Total 
Patents      
88-94 9 39 19 24 91 
95-00 8 63 26 25 122 
Total 17 102 45 49 213 
Publications      
90-95 15 62 35 89 201 
96-01 10 117 43 79 249 
Total 25 179 78 168 450 
N. of authors+ 72 311 253 527 1138 
+ The sum of the number of authors across fields is 1163, the total number of authors is 1138 because 25 authors publish 
in two different fields, in particular 20 authors in pharma and biology 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics on the number of authors and number of inventors for each potential and 
selected patent-publication pairs, total samples and by scientists’ fields 
 No. of author (a) No. of Inventor (b) (a)-(b) 
Selected PPPs    
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 680 680  
Mean 4.90 3.35 1.54 
Median 4 3 1 
St. dev. 2.67 2.50  
Min 1 1  
Max 19 21  
Potential PPPs    
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 6810 6810  
Mean 8.51 3.62 4.89 
Median 5 3 2 
St. dev. 1.41 3.53  
Min 1 1  
Max 517 21  
   Pharmacology (selected PPP)   
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 104 104  
Mean 6.46 3.60 2.86 
Median 6 3 3 
St. dev. 2.71 2.01  
Min 2 1  
Max 14 10  
   Biology (selected PPP)    
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 222 222  
Mean 5.94 3.55 2.39 
Median 6 3 3 
St. dev. 2.51 3.91  
Min 2 1  
Max 13 21  
  Chemical Eng. & Materials 
Tech. (selected PPP) 
   
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 27 27  
Mean 4.48 4.78 -0.30 
Median 4 4 0 
St. dev. 1.60 2.10  
Min 2 2  
Max 8 11  
   Electronics and Telecom 
(selected PPP)    
Obs. (No. of PPPs) 327 327  
Mean 3.73 3.03 0.70 
Median 3 3 0 
St. dev. 2.27 1.12  
Min 1 1  
Max 19 6  
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Table 3.  Number of authors, by number of authors in each publication and position in the by-line 
  Nr of authors by position: 
Nr of authors in 
the publication 
Number of 
publications FIRST  MIDDLE  LAST 
     
1 4 4   
2 78 78  78 
3 167 167 167 167 
4 138 138 276 138 
5 80 80 240 80 
6 66 66 264 66 
7 52 52 260 52 
8 25 25 150 25 
9 26 26 182 26 
10 9 9 72 9 
11 14 14 126 14 
>11 21 21 240 21 
     
Total: 680 680 1977 676 
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Table 4. Count of exclusions (and non exclusions) from inventorship. by position of the author in the 
by-line of the publication in the PPP 
 FIRST MIDDLE LAST  
Position in the 
by-line 
Non 
excluded 
Excluded 
Non 
excluded 
Excluded 
Non 
excluded 
Excluded Total 
1 336 344     680 
2   215 383 60 18 676 
3   122 309 103 64 598 
4   73 220 78 60 431 
5   49 164 42 38 293 
6   22 125 36 30 213 
7   18 77 24 28 147 
8   10 60 8 17 95 
9   8 36 17 9 70 
10   5 30 4 5 44 
11   3 18 9 5 35 
>11   2 28 6 15 51 
Total 336 344 527 1450 387 289 3333 
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics for the regression sample. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Y 1997 .83 .37 0 1 
FIRST 1997 .17 .37 0 1 
MIDDLE 1997 .70 .46 0 1 
LAST 1997 .14 .35 0 1 
SENIORITY 1997 7.70 7.78 -2 26 
PUB_STOCK(T-1) 1997 18.76 34.81 0 299 
N_AUT 1997 7.21 3.36 2 19 
DELTA_YEARS 1997 .48 1.30 -2 2 
MOST_JUNIOR 1997 .36 .48 0 1 
MOST_SENIOR 1997 .15 .36 0 1 
TOP_SCHOLAR 1997 .10 .30 0 1 
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR 1997 .32 .47 0 1 
RELATIVE 
SENIORITY 
1997 .39 .39 0 1 
RELATIVE 
PUB_STOCK 
1997 .24 .33 0 1 
CHEMISTRY 1997 .04 .19 0 1 
ELECTRONICS 1997 .24 .43 0 1 
PHARMA 1997 .20 .40 0 1 
BIOLOGY 1997 .52 .50 0 1 
FEMALE 1897 .36 .48 0 1 
FIRST*FEMALE 1897 .07 .25 0 1 
MEDIUM*FEMALE 1897 .27 .45 0 1 
LAST*FEMALE 1897 .02 .15 0 1 
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Table 6. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
FIRST  -1.05*** -0.95*** -1.02*** -1.04*** -0.96*** -1.03***  
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28)  
LAST  -0.86*** -0.90*** -0.87*** -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.76***  
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25)  
DELTA_YEARS  -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.18*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) 
N. OF AUTHORS 0.034 0.056 0.046 0.046 0.069* 0.070** 0.045 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) 
SENIORITY -0.079***   -0.074***   -0.073*** 
 (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017) 
PUB_STOCK(T-1) 0.0060*   0.0067*   0.0068* 
 (0.0036)   (0.0036)   (0.0035) 
MOST_JUNIOR   0.90***   0.92***   
  (0.34)   (0.34)   
MOST_SENIOR  -0.079   0.077   
  (0.35)   (0.34)   
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.43   0.50   
  (0.36)   (0.36)   
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  0.54   0.47   
  (0.36)   (0.37)   
RELATIVE_SENIORITY   -1.62***   -1.59***  
   (0.39)   (0.38)  
RELATIVE_PUB_STOCK   0.75*   1.00***  
   (0.43)   (0.38)  
FEMALE    0.75** 0.84** 0.72**  
    (0.37) (0.37) (0.31)  
FIRST*FEMALE       -0.43 
       (0.63) 
FIRST*MALE       -0.90*** 
       (0.30) 
MIDDLE*FEMALE       0.93*** 
       (0.30) 
LAST*FEMALE       -0.13 
       (0.65) 
LAST*MALE       -0.65** 
       (0.27) 
Constant 0.30 -1.07 0.32 0.13 -1.25 0.36 0.051 
 (1.61) (1.71) (1.69) (1.57) (1.60) (1.62) (1.53) 
        
Observations 1997 1997 1997 1897 1897 1897 1897 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Field dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
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 Table 7.  Change in predicted probabilities of exclusion from inventorship. for changes 
in the author’s position in the by-line. as from regression (1) and (4) 
 Excluded Non Excluded 
FIRST 0.73  
[0.62. 0.85] 
0.27 
NOT FIRST 0.89   
[0.86. 0.91] 
0.11 
Difference -0.16  
LAST 0.76  
[0.66. 0.85] 
0.24 
NOT LAST 0.88  
[0.85. 0.91] 
0.12 
Difference -0.12  
FEMALE 0.91  
[0.87. 0.96] 
0.09 
MALE 0.83  
[0.78. 0.88] 
0.17 
Difference 0.08  
Note. 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis 
 
 
 
  
Table 8. Change in predicted probability of exclusion from inventorship. for changes in author’s 
position in the by-line and different levels of SENIORITY, as from regression (1) in Table 6 
 Last author First author 
SENIORITY Non Excluded Excluded Non Excluded Excluded 
0 0.14 0.86 0.17 0.83 
5 0.21 0.79 0.23 0.77 
10 0.28 0.72 0.30 0.70 
15 0.36 0.64 0.40 0.60 
20 0.46 0.54 0.50 0.50 
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Table 9. Probability of exclusion from inventorship (entire set of publication-related patents): Logit 
regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
FIRST  -0.65** -0.58** -0.62** -0.65** -0.59** -0.66**  
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30)  
LAST  -0.39 -0.45 -0.39 -0.30 -0.36 -0.36  
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)  
DELTA_YEARS  -0.060 -0.067 -0.015 -0.051 -0.063 -0.014 -0.049 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) 
N. OF AUTHORS 0.066* 0.090** 0.076* 0.077** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.075** 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) 
SENIORITY -0.10***   -0.094***   -0.094*** 
 (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022) 
PUB_STOCK(T-1) 0.0058   0.0070*   0.0071* 
 (0.0040)   (0.0040)   (0.0040) 
MOST_JUNIOR   0.68*   0.64*   
  (0.35)   (0.35)   
MOST_SENIOR  -0.31   -0.10   
  (0.47)   (0.45)   
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.28   0.40   
  (0.43)   (0.43)   
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  0.90***   0.90***   
  (0.28)   (0.29)   
RELATIVE_SENIORITY   -1.73***   -1.60***  
   (0.55)   (0.53)  
RELATIVE_PUB_STOCK   0.41   0.55  
   (0.56)   (0.53)  
FEMALE    1.01*** 1.06*** 0.90***  
    (0.38) (0.37) (0.34)  
FIRST*FEMALE       0.30 
       (0.63) 
FIRST*MALE       -0.57* 
       (0.33) 
MIDDLE*FEMALE       1.15*** 
       (0.35) 
LAST*FEMALE       0.19 
       (0.51) 
LAST*MALE       -0.18 
       (0.31) 
Constant 0.81 -0.65 0.80 0.56 -0.92 0.20 0.52 
 (1.48) (1.77) (1.64) (1.43) (1.65) (1.58) (1.40) 
        
Observations 1997 1997 1997 1897 1897 1897 1897 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Field dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.096 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit regressions. (restricted PPP sample: top 5% of 
the similarity score) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
FIRST  -0.92*** -0.81** -0.92*** -0.93*** -0.83** -0.92**  
 (0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.37)  
LAST  -1.01*** -1.04*** -1.06*** -0.90*** -0.90*** -0.96***  
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29)  
DELTA_YEARS  -0.21*** -0.18** -0.17** -0.22*** -0.18** -0.18** -0.21*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) 
N. OF AUTHORS -0.030 0.0013 -0.018 -0.016 0.014 0.025 -0.018 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.055) (0.059) 
SENIORITY -0.089***   -0.081***   -0.081*** 
 (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018) 
PUB_STOCK(T-1) 0.010**   0.010**   0.010** 
 (0.0044)   (0.0043)   (0.0043) 
MOST_JUNIOR   1.32**   1.30**   
  (0.52)   (0.51)   
MOST_SENIOR  0.027   0.16   
  (0.39)   (0.38)   
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.42   0.52   
  (0.44)   (0.44)   
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  -0.057   -0.095   
  (0.51)   (0.50)   
RELATIVE_SENIORITY   -2.11***   -2.00***  
   (0.41)   (0.40)  
RELATIVE_PUB_STOCK   1.60***   1.72***  
   (0.53)   (0.48)  
FEMALE    0.55 0.69* 0.52  
    (0.36) (0.36) (0.32)  
FIRST*FEMALE       -0.38 
       (0.73) 
FIRST*MALE       -0.91** 
       (0.40) 
MIDDLE*FEMALE       0.59* 
       (0.32) 
LAST*FEMALE       -0.55 
       (0.64) 
LAST*MALE       -0.85*** 
       (0.33) 
Constant 0.31 -1.11 0.22 0.16 -1.27 0.23 0.15 
 (0.85) (0.81) (0.86) (0.85) (0.82) (1.06) (0.87) 
        
Observations 960 960 960 900 900 900 900 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Field dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
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 Table 11. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit regressions. by values of DELTA_YEARS 
 DELTA_YEARS≥0 DELTA_YEARS<0 DELTA_YEARS≥0 DELTA_YEARS<0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FIRST  -0.75*** -2.43*** -0.74*** -2.47*** 
 (0.26) (0.48) (0.28) (0.49) 
LAST  -0.97*** -0.67 -0.82*** -0.53 
 (0.24) (0.57) (0.24) (0.57) 
DELTA_YEARS  0.14* -0.29 0.14 -0.35 
 (0.086) (0.31) (0.089) (0.30) 
N. OF AUTHORS  0.039 0.024 0.054 0.039 
 (0.034) (0.098) (0.034) (0.10) 
SENIORITY -0.068*** -0.16*** -0.062*** -0.16*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.017) (0.038) 
STOCK_PUB 0.0069* 0.0030 0.0073* 0.0058 
 (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0051) 
FEMALE   0.72** 1.11* 
   (0.36) (0.57) 
Constant -0.77 1.94 -0.94 0.65 
 (1.48) (1.44) (1.47) (2.86) 
     
Observations 1470 527 1397 500 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y 
Field dummies Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the number of inventors and authors 
 
Note: This figure refers to the total sample of 450 publications and 217 patents. The maximum number of 
co-inventors is 19. There are 11 publications with a number of authors greater than 11 
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